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Finance Commission and the Southern States: 







This  paper  examines  some  of  the  relevant  issues  of  resource 
sharing in the Indian  federation, particularly in the  context of the on-
going deliberations of the 13th Finance Commission. While the focus is 
on the southern states, in matters of fiscal transfers, a segmented view 
cannot  be  taken  as  the  design  of  transfers  has  to  take  into  account 
competing  claims  of  different  states  on  a  limited  pool  of  sharable 
resources. The main transfer–related issues discussed here relate to the 
vertical and horizontal dimensions of fiscal transfers.  
 
Key  Words:  Finance  Commission,  Horizontal  Issues,  Vertical  Issues, 
Regional Government Analysis. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The four southern states of India are Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, 
Tamil  Nadu,  and  Kerala.  All  the  four  states  are  classified  as  general 
category  middle  income  states.  Taken  together,  these  four  states 
contribute more than a quarter of output in India. Their share in the sum 
of GSDPs of all the states has also been large and growing. Even while 
their  tax  bases  have  been  increasing  and  correspondingly  their 
contribution  to  the  base  for  the  central  taxes  has  also  been  growing, 
their share in the tax devolution and in the grants given by the central 
government has been coming down. This has significantly affected their 
capacity to provide services at an adequate level in terms of quantity and 
quality,  particularly  in  relation  to  public  goods  like  law  and  order  and 
justice,  and  merit  goods  like  health  and  education.  These  states  also 
show considerable intra-state inequalities in terms of economic activities 
as well as provision of essential services including health and education.  
 
In  this  paper,  we  examine  some  of  the  relevant  issues  of 
resource sharing in the Indian federation, particularly in the context of 
the  on-going  deliberations  of  the  13
th  Finance  Commission.  While  the 
focus  is  on  the  southern  states,  in  matters  of  fiscal  transfers,  a 
segmented view cannot be taken as the design of transfers has to take 
into  account  competing  claims  of  different  states  on  a  limited  pool  of 
sharable resources. The following are some of the key issues: 
 
Transfer Related Issues 
Vertical: Is the pool of resources available for sharing among the states 
too  small  in  relation  to  the  assigned  responsibilities  of  the  state 
governments? If so, has the central government got more than its due 
share in relation to its responsibilities? 
Horizontal: Whether the southern states have lost unduly in the Finance 
Commission awards? If so, who has got more than their due share? 
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Local  Bodies:  There  are  considerable  deficiencies  in  the  services 
provided  by  the  local  bodies.  In  particular,  there  are  large  intra-state 
imbalances in the level of public provision of public goods like law and 
order and justice, and merit goods like health and education. The issue is 
whether  the  southern  states  are  getting  a  fair  deal  in  the  grants 
earmarked for the urban and rural local bodies.  
 
Other Contextual Issues 
GST: In moving from VAT to GST, there will be a convergence of tax 
rates.  The  southern  states  have  typically  a  high  revenue-neutral  rate 
(RNR).  The  state  component  of  the  GST  rate  is  likely  at  best  to  be 
revenue neutral with respect to all states. But the southern states have a 
higher RNR and may lose out in relative terms at least in the short run. If 
the country does embark on to GST in 2010, all the estimates prepared 
by  the  Finance  Commission  will  have  to  take  the  differential  revenue 
impact  of  the  GST  into  account  and  traditional  methodologies  of 
estimation of own tax revenues will not work.  
 
Special Problems: The Southern states, taken together, have a large 
share  of  India‟s  coastal  areas.  These  require  special  attention  and 
resources. While forest areas have deserved additional grants from the 
Finance Commission, coastal areas have not been brought on board. Is it 
time to do so? 
 
Ecological Protection: Related to the coastal areas is the issue of rich 
ecology  in  term  of  seaweeds  and  marine  life  that  requires  special 
attention.  The  Thirteenth  Finance  Commission  has  a  specific  term  of 
reference in the context of ecology and environment.  
 
State Specific Problems 
Each of the southern states has a distinct special problem that requires 
the  attention  of  the  Finance  Commission.  For  example,  Tamil  Nadu  is   3 
characterized by a serious shortage  of water giving rise to tensions with 
the neighboring states.  
 
This paper has seven sections. Section 2 discusses three basic 
features of the southern states: share of their GSDP in all-state GSDP, 
share  of  the  population  in  all-state  population,  and  their  average  per 
capita GSDP relative to the all-state average per capita GSDP. Section 3 
discusses issues of vertical and horizontal transfers highlighting how over 
the  long  rune,  the  share  of  the  southern  states  in  the  transfers  has 
eroded.  Section  4  discusses  issues  arising  from  the  implementation  of 
GST,  particularly  for  the  southern  states.  Section  5  highlights  the 
problems  of  intra-state  imbalances  focusing  on  Tamil  Nadu.  Section  6 
looks at some special problems of the southern states, particularly those 
arising from the large coastal areas that they need to manage.  
 
Some Basic Features of the Southern States 
Before analyzing the issue of fiscal transfers, it is useful to look at three 
basic features of the four southern states, viz., their contribution in the 
economic activities of the country, their share of population, and their 
relative position in terms of per capita incomes.  
 
Taken together, the four southern states contribute a little more 
than one-fourth of the all-state GSDP. As shown in Table 1, the share of 
the southern states in the all-state GSDP has increased over time, but 
only marginally. Since 1993-94, when their share was a little more than 
25 percent of the all-state GSDP at current prices, it has increased by a 
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Table 1: Share of GSDP of the Southern States in All State-GSDP 
 (percent) 
   Andhra 
Pradesh 
Karnataka  Tamil 
Nadu 
Kerala  Total 
Southern 
States 
1993-94  7.88  5.49  8.06  3.81  25.24 
1994-95  8.00  5.45  8.19  3.93  25.56 
1995-96  8.05  5.55  8.10  4.15  25.85 
1996-97  7.89  5.59  8.02  4.13  25.63 
1997-98  7.55  5.65  8.39  4.14  25.74 
1998-99  7.96  5.97  8.42  4.13  26.48 
1999-00  7.92  5.89  8.21  4.20  26.21 
2000-01  8.28  5.88  8.38  4.12  26.66 
2001-02  8.50  5.84  8.07  4.19  26.60 
2002-03  8.41  5.87  7.92  4.31  26.51 
2003-04  8.45  5.69  7.79  4.25  26.18 
2004-05  8.37  5.91  7.98  4.26  26.52 
2005-06  8.45  6.11  8.00  4.26  26.82 
Source (Basic Data): Central Statistical Office. 
 
Within the group of the four states, the share of Tamil Nadu and 
Andhra  Pradesh    are  the  relatively  larger  shares  as  shown  Table  1. 
Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu account for about 8 percent of the all-
state GSDP while Karnataka and Kerala have respectively shares of 6.1 
and 4.3 percent. Chart 1 shows the change over time in the profile of 
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Table 2: Share of the Southern States in All-State Population 
                         (percent) 
   Andhra 
Pradesh 
Karnataka  Kerala  Tamil Nadu  Southern 
States 
1992-93  7.96  5.37  3.46  6.60  23.39 
1993-94  7.92  5.37  3.40  6.56  23.24 
1994-95  7.89  5.36  3.36  6.51  23.12 
1995-96  7.85  5.35  3.32  6.45  22.98 
1996-97  7.81  5.34  3.29  6.40  22.84 
1997-98  7.76  5.32  3.26  6.35  22.68 
1998-99  7.70  5.29  3.23  6.29  22.51 
1999-00  7.65  5.24  3.19  6.24  22.32 
2000-01  7.57  5.23  3.16  6.19  22.14 
2001-02  7.48  5.21  3.12  6.13  21.95 
2002-03  7.48  5.19  3.11  6.09  21.88 
2003-04  7.45  5.18  3.10  6.05  21.77 
2004-05  7.41  5.16  3.08  6.01  21.66 
2005-06  7.47  5.21  3.11  6.04  21.83 
Source:  As in Table 1.   6 
Table  2  shows  the  share  of  the  southern  states  in  all-state 
population.  Compared  to  the  rising  trend  in  the  all-state  GSDP,  their 
aggregate share in population has come down. Taken together, the four 
southern states account for a little less than 22 percent of the all-state 
population. In fact, their share in population has come down over the 
years. Thus, in 2005-06, their share in all-GSDP was nearly 5 percentage 
points higher than their share in all-state population. The changes in the 
relative shares in GSDP and population are reflected in the per capita 
GSDP of these states compared to the all-state average per capita GSDP.  
 
Table 3: Per Capita GSDP of Southern States Relative to All States 
(Current Prices, 1999-00 base series) 









1993-94  9367  8608  108.8 
1994-95  10984  9914  110.8 
1995-96  12614  11194  112.7 
1996-97  14228  12656  112.4 
1997-98  15670  13784  113.7 
1998-99  18157  15409  117.8 
1999-00  19458  16569  117.4 
2000-01  20996  17437  120.4 
2001-02  21888  18067  121.2 
2002-03  23322  19250  121.2 
2003-04  25726  21394  120.2 
2004-05  28703  23445  122.4 
2005-06  31923  25982  122.9 
Source: As in Table 1. 
Note: PCGSDP- per capita gross state domestic product 
As shown in  Table 3, in  1993-94, the  per capita  GSDP  of the 
southern  states  was  only  about  9  percent  higher  than  the  all-state 
average  per  capita  GSDP.    By  2005-06,  the  per  capita  GSDP  has 
increased  to  become  nearly  23  percent  higher  than  the  all-state  per 
capita GSDP.   7 
 
Resource Sharing: Vertical and Horizontal Issues 
The  issues  of  fiscal  transfers  relate  to  their  vertical  and  horizontal 
dimensions.  The  vertical  dimensions  relates  to  the  relative  shares  of 
resources  between  the  centre  and  the  states  taken  as  a  group.  The 
horizontal dimension relates to the inter se distribution of the resources 
among the states. We consider the horizontal dimension first. 
 
Horizontal Issues 
There  are  four  competing  groups  of  states:  southern  states  (largely 
middle income states), high income states, low income states, and the 
special  category  states.  Chart    2  and  Table  4  show  the  share  of  the 
southern states in total transfers. Comparing the changes between the 
Third and Twelfth Finance Commissions, for the southern states, there 
has  been  a  loss  of  about  9.5  percentage  points  in  their  share  taken 
together as compared to the other categories of states from nearly 28 
percent to just above 18 percent of total transfers. The major gainers 
have been the low income states and the special category states who 
gained  respectively  10.6  and  7.8  percentage  points.    Because  of  the 
changes  in  the  organization  of  states,  it  may  be  better  to  make  a 
comparison between the Twelfth and Fifth Finance Commissions. In this 
case, the erosion of the relative share in total transfers of the southern 
states is 5.4 percentage points and the gain for the low income states 
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Table 4: Share in Total transfers for Different Groups of States 
(percent) 













Third  27.86  20.01  45.87  6.25 
Fourth  29.33  16.52  44.73  9.42 
Fifth  23.77  17.02  49.37  9.84 
Sixth  22.90  14.81  49.17  13.13 
Seventh  23.19  16.47  51.08  9.26 
Eighth  21.46  13.35  51.60  13.59 
Ninth(1)  20.43  13.53  50.08  15.97 
Ninth(2)  19.99  12.69  52.62  14.70 
Tenth  21.89  13.05  49.77  15.29 
Eleventh  19.17  9.60  56.65  14.58 
Twelfth  18.36  11.17  56.43  14.04 
Twelfth-Third  -9.50  -8.84  10.55  7.79 
Twelfth-Fifth  -5.41  -5.85  7.06  4.20 
Source  (Basic  Data):  Vithal  and  Sastry  (2001)  and  Reports  of  the  Finance 
Commission. 
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Table 5: Share of Different Categories of States in Tax Devolution 
(percent) 














Third  24.52  22.75  48.13  4.60 
Fourth  24.47  21.96  48.11  5.46 
Fifth  24.06  19.68  52.05  4.21 
Sixth  24.84  19.30  51.08  4.79 
Seventh  24.70  17.71  52.81  4.78 
Eighth  22.90  14.22  52.21  10.68 
Ninth(1)  22.51  13.82  53.16  10.51 
Ninth(2)  22.15  14.13  51.46  12.27 
Tenth  22.39  13.14  51.01  13.46 
Eleventh  21.07  9.75  61.88  7.30 
Twelfth  19.79  11.20  60.85  8.17 
Twelfth-Third  -4.73  -11.55  12.71  3.57 
Twelfth-Fifth  -4.28  -8.48  8.80  3.96 
Source: As in Table 4 
 
Total transfers consist of tax devolution and grants. Tables 5 and 
6 show changes in the shares of the different groups of states in respect 
of tax devolution and Finance commission grants. It may be noted that 
the loss of share of the southern states in tax devolution has been about 
5 percentage points from 24.5 percent to below 20 percent comparing 
the Twelfth and the Third Finance Commissions. Chart  3 highlights the 
large  shift  in  favour  of  the  special  category  states  in  the  case  of  the 
eighth Finance Commission and a large shift in favour of the low income 
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In  the  case  of  grants  by  the  Finance  Commission,  the  erosion  in  the 
share of the states has been more pronounced (Chart  4).  
 
Chart  4: Share in Finance Commission Grants of Different 
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At  its  peak,  the  share  of  the  southern  states  was  nearly  44 
percent. It has now fallen to about 12 percent of total grants, a fall of 
nearly 30 percentage points. But as far as the gainers are concerned, the 
pattern is different form that in the case of sharing in central taxes.  
 

















Third  41.80  8.61  36.48  13.11 
Fourth  44.09  0.00  34.44  21.47 
Fifth  21.87  0.00  32.18  45.95 
Sixth  16.53  0.00  42.85  40.62 
Seventh  3.11  0.00  28.06  68.83 
Eighth  5.52  3.61  44.81  46.06 
Ninth (1)  5.74  11.48  28.37  54.41 
Ninth (2)  8.17  4.83  58.98  28.02 
Tenth  17.17  12.19  38.17  32.47 
Eleventh  9.08  8.79  28.91  53.21 
Twelfth  11.68  11.03  35.68  41.61 
Twelfth-Third  -30.12  2.42  -0.80  28.50 
Twelfth-Fifth  -10.19  11.03  3.50  -4.34 
Source: As in Table 4 
 
In the case of grants, the relative gain for the low income states 
has  been  small  whereas  the  gainers  are  the  high  income  states  who 




We now consider the vertical dimension of transfers, that is, the sharing 
of resources in relation to responsibilities. We look at the profile of the 
respective  shares  of  centre  and  the  states  in  the  combined  pool  of 
revenues as well as expenditures.    12 
Table 7: Transfers Relative to Percent  of Centre's Gross 
Revenue Receipts 
Average for Finance 
Commission  
Periods 
Transfers as percent of 
CGRR Share  GDPmp Share 
First  23.9  1.2 
Second  30.7  2.0 
Third  25.1  2.3 
Fourth  31.1  2.6 
Fifth  34.7  3.3 
Sixth  31.8  3.5 
Seventh  38.2  4.4 
Eighth  38.1  4.8 
Ninth  39.1  4.8 
Tenth  35.6  4.1 
Eleventh  35.9  4.2 
Twelfth*  40.8  5.2 
Source (Basic Data): Indian Public Finance Statistics and CSO. 
Note: * average of 3 years (2005-08). 
 
Leaving the three years of the Twelfth Finance Commission, the 
pattern (Table 7) indicates that the share of states in the total transfers 
as  percentage  of  revenue  receipts  peaked  in  the  period  of  the  Ninth 
Finance Commission at slightly above 39 percent of the centre‟s gross 
revenue receipts. In fact, it was close to above 38 percent for the 15 
years covered by the recommendation periods of Seventh, Eighth, and 
the Ninth Finance Commission.  A similar pattern is reflected in terms of 
transfers  as  percentage  of  GDP.  In  the  case  of  the  Twelfth  Finance 
Commission, the total transfers have gone up again crossing 40 percent 
but need to wait to see what will the impact of the on-going slowdown 
on centre‟s resources.  
 
In spite of the fall from the peak in the level of transfers, states 
have  got  a  progressively  increasing  share  in  the  combined  revenue 
receipts of the centre and the states.  
   13 
Table  8  shows  the  share  of  the  centre  and  the  states  in  the 
combined revenue receipts before and after transfers. In this case also, 
the long-term trend indicates a progressive increase until the share of 
states  seems  to  stabilize  around  64  percent  in  the  time  of  the  Ninth 
Finance Commission with a small fall in subsequent years. 
 
Table 8: Share of Centre and States in Revenue Receipts: Before 





Before Transfers  After Transfers 
Centre    States  Centre  States 
First  58.1  41.9  44.2  55.8 
Second  62.4  37.6  42.8  57.2 
Third  66.3  33.7  48.1  51.9 
Fourth  65.0  35.0  43.3  56.7 
Fifth  65.6  34.4  41.2  58.8 
Sixth  65.6  34.4  43.6  56.4 
Seventh  64.2  35.8  38.5  61.5 
Eighth  64.8  35.2  38.5  61.5 
Ninth  62.5  37.5  35.9  64.1 
Tenth  61.3  38.7  37.0  63.0 
Eleventh  60.9  39.1  36.7  63.3 
Twelfth*  62.8  37.2  36.5  63.5 
Source: As in Table 7. 
 
The corresponding share of the states in the combined revenue 
and total expenditures do not show a similar increasing pattern. Instead, 
there is a much greater stability reflected there. Table 9 gives the relative 
shares of the centre and the states in revenue and total expenditures. 
There  has  been  a  remarkable  stability  in  regard  to  these  shares 
particularly  for  revenue  expenditures  throughout  the  periods  covered 
from the First to the Twelfth Finance Commissions.  
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Table 9: Relative Shares of Centre and States in Revenue and 
Total Expenditures 
(percent) 




Total Expenditure  Revenue Expenditure 
Centre  States  Centre  States 
First  43.83  56.17  40.77  59.2 
Second  49.47  50.53  41.83  58.2 
Third  50.51  49.49  46.10  53.9 
Fourth  47.69  52.31  41.77  58.2 
Fifth  43.14  56.86  40.00  60.0 
Sixth  47.35  52.65  44.19  55.8 
Seventh  44.79  55.21  41.98  58.0 
Eighth  47.86  52.14  44.22  55.8 
Ninth  45.58  54.42  43.45  56.5 
Tenth  43.35  56.65  43.18  56.8 
Eleventh  43.77  56.23  44.03  56.0 
Twelfth*  43.18  56.82  43.52  56.5 
All-period Average  45.88  54.12  42.90  57.1 
Source: As in Table 7. 
 
The share in the revenue expenditure has oscillated around the 
all-period average of 43 percent through out the award periods covered 
by the First to Twelfth Finance Commissions. At the highest, it was 46 
percent in the Third Finance Commission period and at the lowest it was 
40  percent  in  the  period  of  the  Fifth  Finance  Commission. 
Correspondingly,  the  share  of  states  in  the  combined  revenue 
expenditures has been around 57 percent. At the highest, it was at 60 
percent and at the lowest, it was 56 percent. As far as total expenditures 
are concerned, the share of the centre has been slightly higher at around 
the average of 46 percent and correspondingly that for states has been 
around the average of 54 percent. For the periods covered by the Tenth 
to  Twelfth  Finance  Commissions  both  revenue  and  total  expenditures 
seem to be remaining closely around the averages of 43 and 57 percent 
respectively for the centre and the states.   15 
Chart  5 shows the year-wise figures over period from 1950-51 to 
2007-08. The vertical problems are more qualitative in nature. Several 
issues are critical. First, the centre spends an inordinately large amount 
on subjects that according to the constitutional scheme of assignment 
are in the state list.  
 
Secondly,  the  central  government  has  continued  with  large 
amount of cesses and surcharges that are not sharable with the state 
governments under the provisions of article 270. Even when the central 
government  passes  on  some  amounts  to  spent  by  the  states,  the 
distribution of that amount among the states is arbitrarily done by the 
concerned ministries and often not transparent.  
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Thirdly, the centre has continued to insist on implementation of a 
plethora of centrally sponsored schemes, imposing its own priorities and 
preferences.  This  may  be  understandable  for  one  or  two  areas.  But 
centre  finds  ways  of  proliferating  the  number  of  areas  and  schemes 
without any rationale. Further, states have to bear a substantial part of   16 
the  expenditure  from  their  own  resources  as  part  of  states‟  share  of 
expenditure on the centrally sponsored schemes and the states have to 
follow numerous guidelines preempting a lot of administrative resources 
for  this  purpose.  In  a  recent  submission  to  the  Thirteenth  Finance 
Commission, the Empowered Committee of the State Finance Ministers 
argued  that  of  the  projected  total  central  assistance  for  the  11
th  plan 
period  of  about    Rs.  3,25,000  crore  nearly  2/3
rd  will  on  the  centrally 
sponsored schemes and in order to make sure that such a large space 
remains for the CSS, the Thirteenth Finance Commission has been asked 
to  take  into  account  the  gross  budgetary  support  to  the  plan  that  is 
supposed  to  comprise  primarily  of  such  centrally  sponsored  schemes. 
Fourth, in many cases, the centre bypasses the state governments and 
incurs expenditure in state jurisdictions through ad hoc local bodies.   
 
Moving from VAT to GST: Implications for the Southern States 
From VAT to GST   
For implementing a comprehensive Goods and Services tax both at the 
centre and the states, several options are being considered ranging from 
a completely centralized levy of GST to a system of extensive State GSTs. 
However, a consensus that seems to be emerging is likely to favour a 
dual system  consisting  of  a GST with two  components: a central GST 
(CGST) and a system of state GSTs (SGST).  The Empowered Committee 
of the State Finance Minsters has worked on a variant of the Goods and 
Services tax that is currently being discussed. The main features of the 
proposed GST are summarized below: 
 
There is a concerted move both by the central government and 
the Empowered Committee of State Finance Ministers to move towards a 
National Goods and Services Tax by April 1, 2010. The main components 
of the scheme being suggested by the Empowered Committee may be 
summarized as follows:  
(a)  For Centre, the following taxes would be subsumed under the GST 
are: Central Excise duties (extended up to the retail level), Additional   17 
Excise duties, Additional Duty of Customs or CVD, CST and Service 
Tax including all cesses and surcharges.  Except for essential services 
such  as  primary  public  health  and  primary  public  education,  all 
services  should  be  comprehensively  covered  under  the  GST.  The 
Additional Duty of Customs (known as CVD) which is essentially an 
excise imports would be subsumed under GST and would be made 
up of the same two components viz. the Central GST and the State 
GST.  
(b)  The major State taxes to be subsumed under GST are: VAT or Sales 
Tax; Entertainment; Tax; Luxury Tax; Octroi or Entry Tax and Taxes 
on Lotteries, Betting and Gambling, and Purchase Tax, and electricity 
duty,  and  any  cesses  and  surcharges  levied  by  the  state 
governments. 
(c)  The Centre shaIl levy one component (Central GST or CGST) and the 
states / Union Territories shall levy the other (State GST of SGST). 
Both  CGST  and  SGST  should  be  applicable,  to  all  transactions  of 
goods and services.  
(d)  HSN classification for goods should be used both for Central GST and 
State GST. 
(e)  A  classification  for  services  should  be  evolved  by  examining 
international  practice,  while  keeping  in  view  the  particular 
characteristics of India‟s services sector 
(f)  Separate accounts should be maintained for the central and the state 
GST.  While input tax credit (ITC) should be permitted within each of 
the taxes, cross flow between Central and State GST should not be 
permitted.  
(g)  Both  CGST  and  SGST  should  ideally  be  at  single  rates.  However, 
certain categories of goods may need to be taxed at a rate lower 
than the standard- rate, both for CGST and SGST.  
(h)  Exports should be fully zero-rated i.e. exports should be relieved of 
the  burden  of  all  embedded  taxes  and  levies,  both  Central  and 
states.   18 
(i)  Demerit goods such as alcoholic beverages and tobacco should be 
brought under GST with ITC. However, Excise duties (without ITC) 
should be levied over and above the GST by both the centre and 
states. 
(j)  Since crude and petroleum products are non-renewable resources, a 
similar  model,  as  recommended  for·  alcoholic  beverages  and 
tobacco, could be adopted. An alternative would be to, keep crude, 
motor spirit, and high speed diesel out of the purview of the GST. 
This would reflect current practice in India that does not allow ITC of 
petrol and diesel to downstream users. 
(k)  The annual turnover threshold should be uniform for the Centre and 
the states. 
(l)  Every  taxpayer,  to  be  assigned  a  common  taxpayer  identification 
number and should be required to submit one periodical return (i.e. 
same document) with one copy to the Central GST authority and the 
other to the concerned State GST authority.  
(m) Inter-state sales should be governed by the destination principle.  
(n)  For operationalizing this, banks are to be used  as an intermediary. It 
would require that the seller in the exporting State collects GST from 
the purchasing dealer in the importing State and deposits it in the 
designated  bank  to  the  credit  of  the  importing  State/Centre.  The 
seller  also  provides  details  of  all  transactions,  including  details  of 
purchasing dealer to the bank.  The bank uploads the information on 
the GST Portal, through which the information becomes available to 
both the central as well as State Authorities.  The purchasing dealer 
claims  ITC  on  the  basis  of  a  digitally  signed  challan  sent  by  the 
seller's bank. The importing State/Centre grants ITC on the basis of 
the credit received by them from the bank in the exporting State. 
(o)  Under  the  GST  exemptions  should  be  minimized.    The  dual  GST 
structure at the Central and the State levels should have a common 
list of exemptions. Specific provisions to provide limited flexibility to 
the states within a set of prescribed criteria may be incorporated in 
order to accommodate exemption of goods of local importance.    19 
(p)  CST would be eliminated.  
 
Union  and  State  taxes  on  petroleum  and  related  products 
contribute about 40 percent of the revenue from Central Excise duty as 
also significant shares of states tax revenues.  At present, neither the 
Union  government  nor  the  State  Governments  allow  ITC  on  major 
petroleum  products.  The  Empowered  Committee  has  suggested  two 
alternatives.  In  the  first  model,  all  petroleum  products  should  be 
subjected to GST (with ITC).  Over and above GST, both the Centre and 
the States can levy additional excise duty (without ITC) at different rates 
subject to a floor. Alternatively, out of the basket of petroleum products, 
Crude, Motor Spirit (including ATF) and HSD could be kept outside GST, 
reflecting  administrative  considerations,  as  is  the  prevailing  practice  in 
India.  Taxation of the remaining products would be with ITC with the 
provision additional duty without ITC.    
 
These proposal have significant revenue implications although no 
doubt overall efficiency in production and sales as well compliance costs 
will go down. Much will depend on the level at which the overall GST rate 
is  fixed  and  its  components  for  the  central  and  the  state  GSTs.  The 
southern  states  have  typically  a  high  revenue-neutral  rate  (RNR).  The 
state component of the GST rate is likely at best to be revenue neutral 
with respect of all-state revenue. But the southern states have a higher 
RNR and may lose out in relative terms at least in the short run. If the 
country does embark on to GST in 2010, all the estimates prepared by 
the Finance Commission will have to take the differential revenue impact 
of the GST into account and traditional methodologies of estimation of 
own tax revenues will not work. 
 
Integrating Eco Taxes and the GST 
Another  contextual  issues,  also  specifically  refereed  to  the  Thirteenth 
finance  Commission  relates  to  the  ecology  and  environment.  This  has 
special relevance in the context of the proposed GST.    20 
 
Proponents  of  eco-taxes  have  argued  for  a  „green  shift‟  in 
taxation of goods and services, which implies that the overall tax burden 
does  not  increase  on  the  system  so  that  inefficiency  costs  of  excess 
taxation  such  as  deadweight  losses,  compliance,  costs,  and 
administrative  costs  do  not  increase.  In  undertaking  reforms  of  the 
taxation of goods and services one needs to ensure that the ecological 
tax reforms are an integral part of the overall tax reforms. It should be 
recognized that in a value added tax regime, input taxes are to be fully 
rebated. As such, taxation of polluting inputs will be ineffective as the tax 
paid on the inputs will be fully rebated, unless a non-rebatable cess is 
levied  on  the  inputs.  The  more  appropriate  method  would  be  to  tax 
outputs  and  introduce  ecological  considerations  by  taxing  at  a  higher 
rate, outputs that are either polluting or use highly polluting inputs. Eco-
taxes should be designed in an integrated way for taxation at the central, 
state and local levels. These should complement each other and should 
not be at cross purposes. Global sources of pollution or pollution where 
state boundaries are generally crossed should be taxed at the national 
level, regional sources at the state level, and pollution with strong local 
characteristics should be taxed at the local level. There should be inter-
state coordination so that as result of taxation of polluting inputs and 
outputs, industries do not attempt to relocate in other states where eco-
taxes are less stringent.   
 
The  13
th  Finance  Commission  should  ensure  that  inter-state 
coordination takes place at the level of the states and they do not suffer 
any  revenue  loss  if  industries  relocate  themselves.  Further,  special 
provisions have to be made in the case of the Special Economic Zones 
and Export Oriented Units who are given inputs including polluting inputs 
on a zero-rated basis. While their products may be exported or treated as 
imports if sold in the domestic economy, much of the pollution that they 
generate is affecting the  geographical area in which they are located. 
Polluting inputs in their case should not be zero-rated. They should also   21 




There are issues both of inter-state and intra-state imbalance. Here, we 
look at some dimensions of inter-district imbalances in the case of Tamil 
Nadu. Similar problems are there for the other southern states. Tamil 
Nadu has thirty districts. In about 2/3
rd of the districts, the per capita 
income  is  below  the  per  capita  income  of  the  state.  The  Worker 
Participation Rates are also unevenly distributed across the districts of 
Tamil Nadu. The low income districts have relatively lower index values in 
the Human Development Index (HDI), and income deficiency accounts 
for  a  larger  weight  in  explaining  the  shortfall  in  HDI  from  the 
benchmarks,  whereas  education  and  health  attainments  are  spatially 
better distributed. 
 
Table 10 summarises the relative position of the thirty districts of 
Tamil  Nadu  in  respect  of  the  four  components  of  the  Human 
Development  Index.  As  far  as  district  level  economic  activities  are 
concerned, as proxied by the per capita District Gross Domestic Product 




   22 
Table 10: District Level Indicators: Human Development Index 
S.
N. 

























1  Chennai  84.80  86.35  85.36  5496.88  0.842 
2  Kanchipuram  76.50  83.63  86.78  4326.55  0.778 
3  Thiruvallur  75.50  82.47  86.01  4178.20  0.767 
4  Cuddallore  71.80  77.42  88.41  2478.36  0.709 
5  Villupuram  72.20  69.88  79.65  1801.20  0.667 
6  Vellore  71.40  78.73  82.17  2854.90  0.710 
7  Thiruvannamalai  71.60  73.51  79.48  2034.94  0.678 
8  Salem  74.00  70.81  88.32  3034.49  0.717 
9  Namakkal  69.80  72.90  96.32  3453.60  0.715 
10  Dharmapuri  69.80  63.82  82.88  2244.85  0.656 
11  Erode  73.10  70.59  86.38  3689.20  0.721 
12  Coimbatore  73.80  82.91  94.27  4741.27  0.775 
13  The Nilgiris  73.10  87.75  80.45  3218.70  0.745 
14  Tiruchirapalli  76.60  74.07  87.65  2919.00  0.737 
15  Karur  76.60  74.07  87.65  2919.00  0.737 
16  Perambalur  71.70  70.35  85.14  2890.54  0.697 
17  Thanjavur  71.90  81.97  84.17  2454.29  0.714 
18  Thiruvarur  72.70  82.86  85.09  2341.36  0.719 
19  Nagapattinam  74.70  82.85  87.19  2576.49  0.738 
20  Pudukkottai  72.00  77.21  85.62  2408.24  0.705 
21  Madurai  73.40  84.75  93.77  3467.72  0.759 
22  Theni  69.30  77.59  92.01  3991.90  0.726 
23  Dindigul  69.40  75.24  87.03  3300.16  0.705 
24  Ramanathapuram  69.60  78.71  84.38  2853.97  0.703 
25  Virudhunagar  69.40  79.98  88.46  4689.66  0.737 
26  Sivagangai  69.80  78.29  86.85  2616.29  0.701 
27  Thirunelveli  71.50  82.94  91.18  3383.02  0.740 
28  Thoothukudi  78.20  88.31  85.07  3928.26  0.791 
29  Kanniyakumari  72.60  94.94  90.31  2905.58  0.763 
30  Krishnagiri  71.90  63.82  80.74  2244.85  0.665 
   Tamil Nadu  72.80  79.16  88.82  3363.11  0.736 
Source: Eleventh Five Year Plan: Tamil Nadu, State Planning Commission, 2008. 
Notes:  LEB- computed by SPC using the data of VES 2006, FW dept., LR – computed by SPC using NSS 
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st  round  and  Census  2001  data.  GER  –  computed  by  SPC  using  the  data  on  school 
enrolment 2006-07 of school education department. Projected population 2006 by DOES. Age 
wise population as proportion of 2001 census. Real PCGDDP – computed by SPC using the 
data on district wise per capita income 2002-03 and PPP$ value from Global HDR 2004. 
 
In terms of purchasing power parity, the real per capita DGDP for 
Tamil Nadu  on an average is estimated to be 3363.11 (PPP$), based on 
the  estimates  prepared  by  the  State  Planning  Commission.  With   23 
reference to the other three determinants of the Human Development 
Index,  i.e.,  life  expectancy  at  birth  (LEB),  literacy  rate,  and  gross 
enrolment ratio (GER), the spread around the mean values is not as large 
as in the case of district income.  
 
Table 11: Index of Deficiency: HDI Components: Ten Most 
Deficient Districts 
LEB at Birth (2006)  Literacy Rate (2004-05) 
Theni  21.29  Dharmapuri  39.31 
Dindigul  21.15  Krishnagiri  39.31 
Virudhunagar  21.15  Villupuram  31.66 
Ramanathapuram  20.88  Perambalur  31.06 
Namakkal  20.60  Erode  30.76 
Dharmapuri  20.60  Salem  30.48 
Sivagangai  20.60  Namakkal  27.84 
Vellore  18.41  Thiruvannamalai  27.07 
Thirunelveli  18.27  Tiruchirapalli  26.36 
Thiruvannamalai  18.13  Karur  26.36 
 
GER  Real Per Capita GDDP (2002-03) PPP$ 
Thiruvannamalai  18.96  Villupuram  109.89 
Villupuram  18.77  Thiruvannamalai  102.94 
The Nilgiris  17.87  Dharmapuri  96.70 
Krishnagiri  17.54  Krishnagiri  96.70 
Vellore  15.93  Thiruvarur  93.83 
Dharmapuri  15.13  Pudukkottai  91.84 
Thanjavur  13.68  Thanjavur  90.47 
Ramanathapuram  13.44  Cuddallore  89.75 
Thoothukudi  12.67  Nagapatinam  86.84 
Thiruvarur  12.64  Sivagangai  85.65 
Source: Based on Table 10.  
   
In order to focus on the deficient districts in respect of critical 
indicators of achievement, we need to focus on relative deficiencies. For 
this purpose, an index of relative deficiency can be used to highlight the 
spatial  dimensions  of  imbalance.  Table  11  converts  the  data  of  10   24 
districts in terms of an index of deficiency for highlighting those districts 
which are the lowest in terms of the selected indicator as well as the 
extent  by  which  they  fall  below  the  average  value  of  the  concerned 
indicator. This index is defined as follows: 
Index of Deficiency = (maximum - actual for a district)/average for  
                                             Tamil Nadu  
Thus, for any indicator, I, the index is given by (Imax - Ii ) / Ia 
Where,  
Imax = maximum index value among all districts, 
Ii   = is the index value of the concerned district, and  
Ia = average value for all districts. 
 
  An  index  of  deficiency  is  useful  for  augmenting  allocation 
efficiency  in  various  expenditures  under  different  programmes  where 
district-wise  allocation  is  in  the  hands  of  the  state  government.  It  is 
expected  that  for  efficiency  gains,  inter-district  allocation  of  resources 
should bear a high positive correlation with the index of deficiency. The 
higher the deficiency the higher the index of deficiency for a district, the 
higher should be its allocation. Two general points are: efficiency gains 
are larger, if the spread in an index of deficiency around the average is 
larger when allocation of expenditures are aligned to the index of  inter-
district deficiency for specific indicators, and two, higher efficiency gains 
will  result  when  different  programmes  addressing  different  needs  (in 
respect of education, health, income, and gender) use specific indices of 
deficiency rather than using composite indices which have been weighted 
in some arbitrary manner. This is so because the order of districts with 
different indicators of deficiencies varies considerably across indicators. 
 
  These indices are prepared for four indicators, life expectancy at 
birth  (LEB),  literacy  rate,  gross  enrolment  ratio  (GER),  and  real  Per 
Capita Gross District Domestic Product (PCGDDP). Table 11 gives the ten 
most deficient districts in respect of each of the four indicators. It can be 
observed  that  the  range  of  variation  relative  to  the  average  for  the 
selected indicators is quite different. For example, in the case of PCGDDP   25 
the range varies from 0-110. In the case of GER, the range varies from 
0-19. As such, the inter-district differences relative to the average are 
lowest for GER, LEB, followed by literacy rate. This indicates that while 
the government has been successful in spreading education and health 
services  better  across  districts,  wide  difference  remain  in  economic 
activities as reflected by the PCGDDP relative to the average.  
 
We  also  consider  the  district  profile  in  terms  of  the  Gender 
Development Index (GDI). Table 12 gives the inter-district profile of life 
expectancy at birth, literacy rate, GER, and per capita income separately 
for  the  male  and  female  population.  Based  on  this,  the  gender 
development  index  (GDI)  is  derived.  The  districts  are  arranged  in 
ascending order of GDI such that the lowest ranked state is listed first 
and the highest ranked state is listed at the end. Here also the worse off 
districts are Dharmapuri, Villupuram, Krishnagiri and Thiruvannamalai. In 
regard to the components of gender deficiency, as far as life expectancy 
at  birth  in  concerned  relative  to  the  Tamil  Nadu  average,  the  lowest 
performing  districts  are  Perambalur,  Thanjavur,  Pudukkottai  and 
Dharmapuri. Perambalur is also the lowest as far as female literacy is 
concerned.  For  GER,  Dharmapuri,  Theni  and  Ramanathapuram  are 
generally placed at the lower end in gender related indices. In respect of 
per  capita  income,  female  earnings  are  the  lowest  in  Thoothukudi, 
Thirunelveli  and  Sivagangai.  In  respect  of  variation  relative  to  the 
average, variation is least for GER, followed by life expectancy at birth 
and  literacy.  Based  on  this,  the  gender  development  index  (GDI)  is 
derived. The districts are arranged in ascending order of GDI such that 
the  lowest  ranked  state  is  listed  first  and  the  highest  ranked  state  is 
listed  at  the  end.  Here  also  the  worst  off  districts  are  Dharmapuri, 
Villupuram, Krishnagiri and Thiruvannamalai.    26 
Table 12: Gender Development Index 
District 
  
LEB  Literacy  GER  Per Capita (PPP$)  GDI 
 
Rank 
   Male  Female  Male  Female  Male  Female  Male  Female 
Dharmapuri   68.5  71.1  73.6  53.5  85.1  80.4  3297.9  1124.8  0.640  30 
Villupuram   69.6  75.6  81.3  58.0  81.3  77.9  2706.4  2706.4  0.651  29 
Krishnagiri  68.3  76.6  75.0  53.5  80.8  80.7  3298.3  1124.9  0.654  28 
Thiruvannamalai   69.3  74.6  85.6  61.4  80.7  78.2  3075.1  990.5  0.662  27 
Perambalur   73.4  70.1  83.1  59.2  85.9  84.4  4391.3  1399.5  0.680  26 
Sivagangai   66.2  74.5  89.5  67.7  88.1  85.5  4038.7  1247.0  0.686  25 
Ramanathapuram   66.9  72.5  88.7  69.3  86.5  82.2  4401.0  1361.7  0.686  24 
Pudukkottai   70.9  73.2  89.0  66.4  86.8  84.4  3676.2  1160.4  0.688  23 
Dindigul   66.9  72.5  85.9  64.6  87.7  86.3  4965.5  1613.3  0.691  22 
Cuddallore   69.4  74.3  88.5  66.4  88.6  88.2  3727.9  1211.9  0.693  21 
Vellore   68.3  75.3  88.4  69.2  83.0  81.3  4319.1  1388.0  0.697  20 
Thanjavur   71.2  72.7  91.4  73.0  83.7  84.6  3757.0  1179.4  0.698  19 
Namakkal   67.8  72.1  83.4  62.1  97.5  95.0  5143.9  1705.9  0.700  18 
Thiruvarur   70.3  75.2  91.5  74.6  84.9  85.2  3571.3  1129.1  0.704  17 
Salem   70.2  78.7  80.5  60.6  87.6  89.2  4434.2  1529.4  0.706  16 
Erode   71.4  74.9  80.7  60.3  86.9  85.8  5510.0  1817.1  0.706  15 
Theni   67.0  71.9  88.2  66.9  94.5  89.3  5982.0  1959.5  0.711  14 
Tiruchirapalli  70.2  75.6  93.2  77.6  79.8  79.9  4508.8  1443.3  0.718  13 
Karur  74.8  78.9  86.0  62.5  88.6  86.7  4444.2  1410.2  0.721  12 
Nagapattinam  72.7  77.0  91.5  74.6  88.8  85.6  3931.6  1241.9  0.723  11 
Virudhunagar   66.8  73.0  90.5  69.9  90.1  86.8  7147.9  2263.1  0.724  10 
Thirunelveli   69.6  73.6  91.8  74.7  92.4  89.9  5233.0  1609.3  0.724  9 
The Nilgiris   68.6  78.3  95.8  80.0  80.9  80.0  4911.4  1551.6  0.731  8 
Madurai   69.6  78.4  93.2  76.2  94.1  93.5  5196.1  1702.4  0.747  7 
Kanniyakumari   70.8  74.5  97.2  93.1  90.5  90.1  4432.3  1401.0  0.749  6 
Thiruvallur   72.4  79.3  90.5  74.3  85.7  86.4  6239.2  2058.4  0.755  5 
Coimbatore   70.8  77.5  89.6  76.1  93.7  94.9  7050.6  2345.8  0.764  4 
Kanchipuram   74.0  79.4  90.7  76.5  85.3  88.4  6471.4  2127.8  0.765  3 
Thoothukudi   75.4  82.2  94.8  82.4  86.7  83.4  6101.2  1861.4  0.779  2 
Chennai   82.0  88.6  90.6  82.1  83.4  87.5  8148.7  2728.6  0.832  1 
Tamil Nadu   70.4  75.7  88.0  70.4  89.3  88.3  5063.0  1643.2  0.722    
Source: Eleventh Five Year Plan: Tamil Nadu, State Planning Commission, 2008. 
Note:   Years for various indicators are the same as in Table 10. For details see the Eleventh Five Year 
Plan Document of the Government of Tamil Nadu.   27 
In  order  to  focus  further  on  the  relative  position  of  female 
population  in  comparison  to  the  male  population,  an  index  of  gender 
deficiency  has  been  arrived  at  by  re-arranging  the  data  of  districts 
focusing on gender deprivation relative to the male population comparing 
the position of each district relative to the position of the average for 
Tamil Nadu. This index is defined as follows: 
For any indictor like LEB or GER, let the relevant index be written 
for female as I
f
i and for male as I
m
i for the i
th district. Here, superscripts 
„m‟ and „f‟ indicate male and female populations respectively. Subscript „i‟ 









where, subscript „a‟ indicates the average for Tamil Nadu. 
 
Table 13: Index of Gender Deficiency: Ten Most Deficient Districts 
  LEB      Literacy   
Perambalur   88.82  Perambalur   89.05 
Thanjavur   94.96  Krishnagiri  89.17 
Pudukkottai   96.02  Villupuram   89.18 
Dharmapuri   96.53  Thiruvannamalai   89.66 
Erode   97.56  Karur  90.84 
Kanniyakumari   97.86  Dharmapuri   90.86 
Karur  98.10  Namakkal   93.08 
Thirunelveli   98.34  Pudukkottai   93.26 
Nagapattinam  98.50  Erode   93.40 
Namakkal   98.90  Cuddallore   93.79 
 
GER    Per Capita Income    
Dharmapuri   95.55  Thoothukudi   94.01 
Theni   95.57  Thirunelveli   94.76 
Ramanathapuram   96.11  Sivagangai   95.14 
Villupuram   96.90  Ramanathapuram   95.33 
Thoothukudi   97.28  Thanjavur   96.72 
Virudhunagar   97.43  Pudukkottai   97.26 
Nagapattinam  97.49  Nagapattinam  97.33 
Thiruvannamalai   98.00  The Nilgiris   97.34 
Sivagangai   98.15  Kanniyakumari   97.39 
Pudukkottai   98.34  Thiruvarur   97.41 
    Source: As in Table 10.   28 
Table 13 gives the ten most deficient districts in terms of gender 
deficiency in respect of the four indicators used in constructing the GDI. 
The  lower  the  value  of  gender  deficiency,  the  more  deficient  is  the 
district. Gender deficiency is measured relative to the average value for 
Tamil  Nadu  as  a  whole.  In  other  words,  we  can  examine  gender 
deficiency in two steps: for Tamil Nadu relative to the norm (=100) and 
for any specific district relative to the Tamil Nadu average. Relative to the 
average,  for  life  expectancy  at  birth,  the  most  deficient  districts  are 
Perambalur,  followed  by  Thanjavur  and  Pudukkottai.  In  the  case  of 
female literacy, the most deficient district is again Perambalur, followed 
by  Krishnagiri  and  Villupuram.  For  GER,  the  female  to  male  ratio,  the 
most deficient districts are Dharmapuri, Theni and Ramanathapuram. In 
terms of per capita income of female in relation to male population, the 
worst off districts are Thoothukudi, Thirunalveli and Sivagangai. 
 
It  will  be  seen  that  in  terms  of  the  components  of  human 
development  as  well  as  gender  development,  there  are  considerable 
differences in the ranking of districts in order of deficiency indicating that 
spatial focus of policies addressing education and health facilities as well 
as  issues  relating  to  gender  development  and  economic  activities  in 
general  need  to  be  dovetailed  towards  the  relatively  more  deficient 
districts in regard to the different indicators.    
 
Coastline and Special Problems 
The Indian coastline is about 7517 km. Of this, about 5423 km are along 
the mainland and 2094 km are along the Andaman and Nicobar islands.  
The  Indian  mainland  consists  of  nearly  43  percent  sandy  beaches,  11 
percent  rocky  coast  with  cliffs  and  46  percent  mud  flats  and  marshy 
coast. It is estimated (see, Kumar et al, 2006) that about 23 percent of 
shoreline along the Indian mainland is affected by erosion. 
 
Erosion along the beaches near river mouths has been commonly 
noticed along Karnataka coast where about about 60 km of beach (19   29 
percent  of  the  total  length  of  shoreline)  is  affected  by  erosion.  The 
problem is relatively more severe in Dakshina Kannada and Udupi coasts, 
where about 28 percent of the total stretch is critical. In Uttara Kannada 
region, about 8 percent of the coast is subjected causing shift in river 
course  or  inlet  migration.  In  Kerala,  about  360  km  long  coastline  is 
exposed to erosion. 
 
Along  Tamil  Nadu  coast,  erosion  is  observed  at  Poompuhar, 
arangampadi,  Nagapattinam,  Mandapam,  Manapadu,  Ovari, 
Kanyakumari, Pallam, Manavalakurichi and Kolachel. The maximum rate 
of erosion along Tamil Nadu coast is about 6.6 m/yr near Royapuram, 
between Chennai and Ennore port. The coast near Ovari is exposed to 
severe erosion in June, whereas alternate erosion and accretion trend 
has  been  noticed  in  Kanyakumari.  The  Andhra  Pradesh  coast  has 
frequently been affected by cyclones and inundated by storm surges  
 
The  backwaters  along  the  east  coast  of  Tamil  Nadu  are  very 
dynamic during the seasonal cycle. The Gulf of Mannar area is rich for 
sea  grass.  Numerous  seaweeds  are  found  in  Gulf  Mannar.  The  total 
productive area estimated is around 10,000 hectares, with a standing of 
more than 18,000 tons.  
 
The Twelfth Finance Commission has initiated special grants for 
forest. Similar special grants need to be considered for coastal areas to 
protect the ecology around these areas and fully develop their economic 
potential.  
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CONCLUSIONS 
In this study, we have looked at the issue of designing fiscal transfers 
keeping the four southern states of India in focus. It is shown that the 
way  fiscal  transfers  under  the  recommendation  of  the  Finance 
Commissions has evolved, the southern states have lost share in overall 
transfers  as  result  of  losing  out  both  in  terms  of  tax  devolution  and 
grants.  The  main  gainers  have  been  the  low  income  states  and  the 
special category states. There is a need to redesign transfers reflecting 
principle  of  equalization  so  that  inefficient  performance  particularly  on 
account tax effort is not rewarded at the cost of other states who have 
been  consistently  doing  well  in  the  tax-GSDP  ratio  even  while  there 
overall economies have been growing faster than the average.  
 
There  are  also  some  topical  issues.  As  part  of  the  overall  tax 
reforms, the central and state governments are heading towards a GST 
regime.  The  transition  may  be  costly  for  the  southern  states,  mainly 
because  of  their  high  tax-GSDP  ratio  compared  to  other  states.  The 
Thirteenth Finance Commission has to take this into account in making 
their assessments apart from the issues of compensation for losses in the 
initial  years.  There  is  need  to  also  take  into  account  their  special 
requirements including their responsibility in maintaining the  ecological 
systems around the large coastline that they have to maintain.    31 
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